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Abstract
In recent years, enlargement of the European Union has brought with it renewed
discussion of voting arrangements in the Council of the EU. During these negoti-
ations, the Polish government proposed a voting scheme that gives each country a
voting weight proportional to the square root of its population, and sets a quota
according to an optimality condition (“Jagiellonian Compromise”). In this paper,
the optimal quota is found exactly for the current population data from the 27 EU
member states, and it is found that rounding of the voting weights can be used to
improve the voting scheme.
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1 Introduction
Following the failure of the draft EU constitution in referenda in France and
the Netherlands, and the subsequent negotiations on a Reform Treaty, the vot-
ing arrangements in the Council of the EU have received a significant amount
of public attention, not least through the Polish proposal of a voting system
that gives every member state a voting weight proportional to the square root
of its population, EUobserver (2007). The idea of this voting scheme is to give
every EU citizen the same influence on decisions in the Council, based on an
analysis of their voting power. The concept of voting power used in this con-
text was first introduced by Penrose (1946), and adapted to the EU framework
by Zyczkowski and Slomczynski (2004), Zyczkowski and Slomczynski (2006).
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The purpose of this paper is twofold: To find an exact value for the optimal
quota required to make the voting scheme as close as possible to the ideal of
equal influence for all citizens, and to demonstrate the impact that rounding
effects have on this quota.
The paper is organised as follows: In section 2, the main ideas behind square
root voting are summarised, and some notation is introduced. Section 3 exam-
ines the effect of using rounded rather than exact voting weights by analysing
two example scenarios. In the example in subsection 3.1, the rounding makes
the voting system less fair, while the example in subsection 3.2 demonstrates
that rounding can actually improve the voting scheme. Section 4 is devoted to
voting in the Council of the EU. The current voting arrangements are briefly
described in subsection 4.1, while square root voting is applied to the EU
context in subsection 4.2 following Zyczkowski and Slomczynski (2004), and
rounding effects are analysed. A similar analysis including member quotas is
carried out in subsection 4.3. Section 5 summarises the results.
2 Voting power and square root voting
The concept of voting power was first introduced by Penrose (1946) for the
UN General Assembly, but his analysis applies to all bodies where votes are
cast by members elected in separate geographical areas with different numbers
of voters, and the elected members from each area cast a joint vote. This is,
for example, the case in the Electoral College in US Presidential elections, and
in the Council of the EU, where the national governments of the (currently)
27 member states are represented.
As the numbers of citizens in the 27 member states differ hugely (between
approximately 400,000 in Malta and 82.3 million in Germany), the task at
hand is to create a “fair” voting system by assigning a voting weight to each
country in the Council, where the most reasonable definition of “fair” is that
every voter should have the same influence on the outcome of votes in the
Council. Thus a mathematically rigorous definition of “influence” is needed.
The first step is to analyse the voting power of each voter within their own
country. Penrose defines voting power as the probability for the vote of one
individual voter to change the voting outcome, assuming that all other voters
vote randomly.
In the following discussion, let us assume that there are only two voting op-
tions, “yes” and “no”, and that the outcome of the vote is positive if there are
more “yes” votes than “no” votes, and negative otherwise.
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In a country with N voters, the total number of possible results of the vote is
2N . “Random voting” means that all these results are equally likely.
If N is odd, the probability for a single voter to make a difference is the
probability that the remaining N −1 votes are evenly split between “yes” and
“no” votes, which is
Podd =
1
2N−1


N − 1
(N − 1)/2

 . (1)
If N is even, the probability for a single vote to be decisive is the probability
that without this vote, there is one “yes” vote more than there are “no” votes,
which means
Peven =
1
2N−1


N − 1
N/2

 . (2)
Using the Stirling approximation for factorials, and the fact that
√
N − 1 ≈
√
N (N ≫ 1), (3)
we obtain for the probability of a single vote to be decisive (ie the voting
power of an individual voter)
PN ∝ 1√
N
. (4)
To give every voter the same influence on the voting outcome in the Council of
the EU, voting weights there must be assigned in such a way, that the voting
power of each country is proportional to the square root of the number of its
inhabitants. This is known as Penrose’s Square Root Law.
The analysis of voting power within the Council (or other body) is also due to
Penrose, but was independently carried out by Banzhaf (1965). Let us assume
the number of members in the decision taking body is n (in the case of the
Council of the EU n = 27). All countries will be assigned voting weights, and
in the following the voting weight of country i will be denoted by vi, where
the weights are normalised such that
n∑
i=1
vi = 1. (5)
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Any subset of countries is called a coalition C, and there will be a quota R
which has to be reached for a positive voting outcome, ie a coalition C will be
successful if
∑
i∈C
vi ≥ R. (6)
The voting power of country i is defined as the probability that its vote is
critical (ie makes a difference to the voting outcome) under the assumption
that the remaining n − 1 countries vote randomly. If the total number of
winning coalitions (ie coalitions that reach the quota) is ω, and the number
of winning coalitions that contain country i is ωi, there are
ηi = 2ωi − ω (7)
coalitions where the vote of country i is critical, ie which would not reach the
quota without country i’s vote. As the vote of the remaining n− 1 countries
can yield 2n−1 different outcomes, which are all equally likely, the probability
for country i’s vote to be critical is
Bi =
ηi
2n−1
. (8)
The number Bi is called the absolute Banzhaf index. For our purposes, it is
useful to introduce the relative Banzhaf index
βi =
Bi∑n
j=1Bj
=
ηi∑n
j=1 ηj
. (9)
To make the voting system fair, we would ideally want
βi =
√
Ni∑n
j=1
√
Nj
(10)
for all countries i, where Ni is the population of country i. Such weights may
not exist, and even finding an approximation by minimising an appropriately
defined deviation of the voting powers from their ideal values is a compli-
cated multi-dimensional optimisation problem. To approximate the ideal vot-
ing power distribution, Penrose suggested to use voting weights proportional
to the square root of the respective populations, ie
vi =
√
Ni∑n
j=1
√
Nj
(11)
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for all countries i. This is the scheme that Zyczkowski and Slomczynski (2004)
and Zyczkowski and Slomczynski (2006) propose for the Council of the EU,
where they choose the quota R such that
σ =
√√√√ 1
n
n∑
i=1
(vi − βi)2 (12)
is minimal. The voting scheme constructed in this way is called the Jagiellonian
Compromise.
A further useful notion is the efficiency ǫ of a voting system (also known as
the Coleman index ), which is the probability for a randomly chosen coalition
to be successful,
ǫ =
ω
2n
. (13)
The concept of square root voting power has been criticised by many authors
(see Garret and Tsebelis (2001), Albert (2003), Bafumi et al. (2004) for recent
criticism) on the grounds that actual voter behaviour is far from random. In
Bafumi et al. (2004), it is shown that in US presidential elections, the random
voting assumption seems to overestimate the probability of close voting out-
comes in larger states, and the authors contrast actual voting power with the
random voting concept. Slomczyn´ski and Zyczkowski, as well as for example
Leech (2003) (following Shapley and Shubik (1954), Banzhaf (1968), Coleman
(1971)) point out that the voting power concept derived from the random
voting assumption is an a priori voting power, based on the freedom of the
voters to make their choice in any way they want, rather than on the way they
actually vote. It is hard to see how a voting system could be based on actual
voting power, as this would have to be determined from previous election re-
sults. This would mean that voters could influence the weight of their votes
in future elections by the way they vote. A further problem with the idea of
basing voting weights on results of earlier elections is that voter behaviour can
change over time, and older election results may not reflect the actual voting
power held by current voters. Actual voting power in Europe may be quite
different from voting power in America. Since January 1997, the governments
of all 27 EU member states have changed at least once as a result of a general
election, which may indicate that close election outcomes are more common
in European countries than in the larger US states. Determining actual voting
power would be a very ambitious project, involving very large separate data
sets from all EU member states, including a large number of election results
and/or sufficiently accurate opinion polls to derive statistical models for voter
behaviour in all countries currently in the EU. In the absence of such data,
and for the reason of making voting weights independent from how voters
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have voted in the past, the square root voting system seems to be the best
one can do. At least it is based on clearly stated assumptions, that can in
principle be tested empirically. This is not the case for the current EU voting
arrangements.
The discussion on what definition of voting power to use is ongoing, and is
not the subject of this paper. Here we will regard a voting system based on
the Penrose definition of voting power as “fair”.
It can reasonably be argued that voting within the Council is not random
either: Governments will, for example, form strategic alliances. However, such
voting behaviour is hard to predict and to include in a model of actual voting
power, and will not be considered here (see Hosli and Machover (2004) for a
more detailed discussion).
3 Rounding errors
The voting weights defined in equation 11 will in general not be rational
numbers, and some rounding rule will have to be applied; even if no precise
rounding rule is given, the weights will be implicitly rounded by the accu-
racy of the floating point representation on the computer system used. In
Zyczkowski and Slomczynski (2004), the authors round all voting weights to
four decimal places behind the decimal point (although it is not entirely clear
if their minimisation of σ is carried out with these rounded weights, or if some
more accurate values are used in the calculation). The purpose of this sec-
tion is to show that the rounding can have a very large effect on the optimal
quota R and on the minimal value of σ that can be achieved by the Penrose
square root voting system. In the following, “k digit rounding” means stan-
dard rounding of voting weights to k decimal places, where voting weights are
normalised according to equation 5.
3.1 Example 1
To demonstrate the effect of rounding errors on the minimisation of σ, let
us consider an example with 4 countries, and different numbers of voters, as
shown in table 1.
In this example, 4 digit rounding is exact. Using the 4 digit voting weights,
we can list the voting weights for all possible coalitions, see table 2.
From this table, we can read off the number ω of coalitions having a majority
for any given quota R, as well as the numbers ωi of these coalitions containing
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Country Ni
√
Ni vi vi (3 digits)
1 20,295,025 4505 0.4505 0.451
2 6,265,009 2503 0.2503 0.250
3 4,012,009 2003 0.2003 0.200
4 978,121 989 0.0989 0.099
Table 1
Example 1: Populations and voting weights for 4 countries.
Countries
∑
vi Countries
∑
vi
1, 2, 3, 4 1.0000 2, 3 0.4506
1, 2, 3 0.9011 1 0.4505
1, 2, 4 0.7997 2, 4 0.3492
1, 3, 4 0.7497 3, 4 0.2992
1, 2 0.7008 2 0.2503
1, 3 0.6508 3 0.2003
2, 3, 4 0.5495 4 0.0989
1, 4 0.5494 None 0.0000
Table 2
Example 1: Coalitions and their voting weights without rounding.
country i. This means that for all quotas 0 ≤ R ≤ 1 and all countries i, the
numbers ηi can be calculated from equation 7, giving the Banzhaf index, and
ultimately the deviation σ from a fair square root voting system. For example,
for 0.9011 < R ≤ 1, there is exactly one successful coalition, containing all
four countries, which means that ηi = 1 for i = 1, . . . , 4. The deviation σ then
follows from equations 8, 9 and 12. The values of σ for all quotas R are shown
in table 3.
A plot of σ as a function of the quota R is shown in figure 1. Only quotas
R >= 0.5 are shown here, as quotas less than 0.5 would mean that a coalition
could be successful even if the opposing coalition has more votes.
The minimum of σ can be read off. We have
σmin = 0.031053, (14)
and the minimum occurs in the interval
0.5494 < R ≤ 0.5495. (15)
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R > R ≤ η1 η2 η3 η4 σ
0.9011 1.0000 1 1 1 1 0.127966
0.7997 0.9011 2 2 2 0 0.109660
0.7497 0.7997 3 3 1 1 0.083069
0.7008 0.7497 4 2 2 2 0.061850
0.6508 0.7008 5 3 1 1 0.061200
0.5495 0.6508 6 2 2 0 0.093088
0.5494 0.5495 5 3 3 1 0.031053
0.4506 0.5494 6 2 2 2 0.061580
0.4505 0.4506 5 3 3 1 0.031053
0.3492 0.4505 6 2 2 0 0.093088
0.2992 0.3492 5 3 1 1 0.061200
0.2503 0.2992 4 2 2 2 0.061850
0.2003 0.2503 3 3 1 1 0.083069
0.0989 0.2003 2 2 2 0 0.109660
0.0000 0.0989 1 1 1 1 0.127966
Table 3
Example 1: Deviation from fair voting without rounding.
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Example 1 without rounding
Fig. 1. Example 1: Deviation from fair voting without rounding.
The situation changes dramatically if σ is calculated from the rounded voting
weights. For this case, the possible coalitions and their voting weights are
shown in table 4.
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Countries
∑
vi Countries
∑
vi
1, 2, 3, 4 1.000 1 0.451
1, 2, 3 0.901 2, 3 0.450
1, 2, 4 0.800 2, 4 0.349
1, 3, 4 0.750 3, 4 0.299
1, 2 0.701 2 0.250
1, 3 0.651 3 0.200
1, 4 0.550 4 0.099
2, 3, 4 0.549 None 0.000
Table 4
Example 1: Coalitions and their voting weights with 3 digit rounding.
Comparison with table 2 shows that the coalition of countries 2, 3 and 4, and
the coalition of countries 1 and 4 have changed places. This leads to different
results for ηi and σ, as shown in table 5.
R > R ≤ η1 η2 η3 η4 σ
0.901 1.000 1 1 1 1 0.127966
0.800 0.901 2 2 2 0 0.109660
0.750 0.800 3 3 1 1 0.083069
0.701 0.750 4 2 2 2 0.061850
0.651 0.701 5 3 1 1 0.061200
0.550 0.651 6 2 2 0 0.093088
0.549 0.550 7 1 1 1 0.154031
0.451 0.549 6 2 2 2 0.061580
0.450 0.451 7 1 1 1 0.154031
0.349 0.450 6 2 2 0 0.093088
0.299 0.349 5 3 1 1 0.061200
0.250 0.299 4 2 2 2 0.061850
0.200 0.250 3 3 1 1 0.083069
0.099 0.200 2 2 2 0 0.109660
0.000 0.099 1 1 1 1 0.127966
Table 5
Example 1: Deviation from fair voting with 3 digit rounding.
Again, σ can be plotted as a function of R, as shown in figure 2.
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Example 1 with 3-digit rounding
Fig. 2. Example 1: Deviation from fair voting with 3 digit rounding.
Reading off the minimum of σ, we find
σmin = 0.061200, (16)
occurring at
0.651 < R ≤ 0.701, (17)
which means that the minimum value of σ has changed dramatically from the
case without rounding (it has more than doubled), and also the interval where
the minimum occurs has completely changed. This shows that rounding can
have a significant impact on the minimum value of σ and the associated quota.
In this example, rounding increases the value of σmin, but in general this is not
necessarily the case. By coincidence, rounding can decrease the value of σmin,
which means that it can improve the Jagiellonian approximation for a voting
system with square root voting power. This is illustrated in Example 2.
3.2 Example 2
This is again an example for four countries, with populations given by table 6.
Again, the 4 digit voting weights are exact, and for these unrounded weights,
we can list all possible coalitions with their voting weights as shown in table 7,
and calculate σ for all values of the quota R (table 8 and figure 3).
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Country Ni
√
Ni vi vi (3 digits)
1 20,376,196 4514 0.4514 0.451
2 6,280,036 2506 0.2506 0.251
3 4,024,036 2006 0.2006 0.201
4 948,676 974 0.0974 0.097
Table 6
Example 2: Populations and voting weights for 4 countries.
Countries
∑
vi Countries
∑
vi
1, 2, 3, 4 1.0000 1 0.4514
1, 2, 3 0.9026 2, 3 0.4512
1, 2, 4 0.7994 2, 4 0.3480
1, 3, 4 0.7494 3, 4 0.2980
1, 2 0.7020 2 0.2506
1, 3 0.6520 3 0.2006
1, 4 0.5488 4 0.0974
2, 3, 4 0.5486 None 0.0000
Table 7
Example 2: Coalitions and their voting weights without rounding.
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Fig. 3. Example 2: Deviation from fair voting without rounding.
We can read off the minimum value of σ, which is
σmin = 0.061093, (18)
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R > R ≤ η1 η2 η3 η4 σ
0.9026 1.0000 1 1 1 1 0.128734
0.7994 0.9026 2 2 2 0 0.109418
0.7494 0.7994 3 3 1 1 0.083351
0.7020 0.7494 4 2 2 2 0.062709
0.6520 0.7020 5 3 1 1 0.061093
0.5488 0.6520 6 2 2 0 0.092371
0.5486 0.5488 7 1 1 1 0.153793
0.4514 0.5486 6 2 2 2 0.061960
0.4512 0.4514 7 1 1 1 0.153793
0.3480 0.4512 6 2 2 0 0.092371
0.2980 0.3480 5 3 1 1 0.061093
0.2506 0.2980 4 2 2 2 0.062709
0.2006 0.2506 3 3 1 1 0.083351
0.0974 0.2006 2 2 2 0 0.109418
0.0000 0.0974 1 1 1 1 0.128734
Table 8
Example 2: Deviation from fair voting without rounding.
and occurs at
0.6520 < R ≤ 0.7020. (19)
As in the previous example, the situation changes significantly if the voting
weights are rounded to three digits. Looking at the coalitions and their voting
weights (table 9), it can be seen that the coalition consisting of countries 1 and
4, and the coalition consisting of countries 2, 3 and 4 have swapped places.
This is reflected in the function σ, as shown in table 10 and figure 4.
Reading off the minimum value of σ, we now obtain
σmin = 0.031004, (20)
occurring at
0.548 < R ≤ 0.549. (21)
In this case, the rounding has actually improved the approximation, the opti-
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Countries
∑
vi Countries
∑
vi
1, 2, 3, 4 1.000 2, 3 0.452
1, 2, 3 0.903 1 0.451
1, 2, 4 0.799 2, 4 0.348
1, 3, 4 0.749 3, 4 0.298
1, 2 0.702 2 0.251
1, 3 0.652 3 0.201
2, 3, 4 0.549 4 0.097
1, 4 0.548 None 0.000
Table 9
Example 2: Coalitions and their voting weights with 3 digit rounding.
R > R ≤ η1 η2 η3 η4 σ
0.903 1.000 1 1 1 1 0.128734
0.799 0.903 2 2 2 0 0.109418
0.749 0.799 3 3 1 1 0.083351
0.702 0.749 4 2 2 2 0.062709
0.652 0.702 5 3 1 1 0.061093
0.549 0.652 6 2 2 0 0.092371
0.548 0.549 5 3 3 1 0.031004
0.452 0.548 6 2 2 2 0.061960
0.451 0.452 5 3 3 1 0.031004
0.348 0.451 6 2 2 0 0.092371
0.298 0.348 5 3 1 1 0.061093
0.251 0.298 4 2 2 2 0.062709
0.201 0.251 3 3 1 1 0.083351
0.097 0.201 2 2 2 0 0.109418
0.000 0.097 1 1 1 1 0.128734
Table 10
Example 2: Deviation from fair voting with 3 digit rounding.
mal value of σ has almost halved. This means that rounding can be used as a
tool in finding the optimal quota, ie σ can be calculated for several rounding
schemes (1 digit, 2 digits, . . . ), and the minimum value of σmin found will then
determine the optimal rounding of the voting weights, and the quota R that
should be chosen.
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Fig. 4. Example 2: Deviation from fair voting with 3 digit rounding.
4 Voting in the Council of the EU
4.1 Current voting arrangements
The current voting procedures in the Council of the EU are laid down in the
Treaty of Nice (European Union (2001)) and the accession treaties for the
member states that joined the EU after the introduction of the Nice voting
scheme (European Union (2003, 2005)). Under this voting scheme, each of the
currently 27 member states is assigned a certain number of votes, and the
votes for all member states add up to 345. For a proposal to be passed, the
following criteria must be met:
(1) The votes of the member states voting “yes” must add up to at least 255.
(2) More than half of the member states (ie currently 14 countries) vote “yes”.
If the Council is not acting on a proposal by the European Commission,
at least two thirds of the member states (ie currently 18 countries) must
vote “yes”.
(3) The countries voting “yes” must represent at least 62% of the population
of the EU.
The last condition is only applied if a member state requests it, and there are
only very few coalitions that satisfy the first two but not the third condition.
The current population numbers (European Statistics Office (2007)) and votes
for each country are given in table 11. At the time of writing, the 2007 pop-
ulation data from Belgium, Ireland and Luxembourg were not available, and
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for these countries, the 2006 data will be used in the calculations in this and
the next two subsections.
Country Population Votes (Nice)
Germany 82, 310, 995 b 29
France 63, 392, 140 b 29
UK 60, 798, 438 b 29
Italy 59, 131, 287 29
Spain 44, 474, 631 27
Poland 38, 125, 479 27
Romania 21, 565, 119 b 14
Netherlands 16, 357, 992 13
Greece 11, 170, 957 b 12
Portugal 10, 599, 095 12
Belgium 10, 511, 382 a 12
Czech Republic 10, 287, 189 12
Hungary 10, 064, 000 b 12
Sweden 9, 113, 257 10
Austria 8, 298, 923 b 10
Bulgaria 7, 679, 290 10
Denmark 5, 447, 084 7
Slovakia 5, 393, 637 7
Finland 5, 276, 955 7
Ireland 4, 209, 019 a,b 7
Lithuania 3, 384, 879 7
Latvia 2, 281, 305 4
Slovenia 2, 010, 377 4
Estonia 1, 342, 409 4
Cyprus 778, 537 b 4
Luxembourg 459, 500 a,b 4
continued on next page
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Malta 406, 020 3
Total 494, 869, 896 345
a 2006
b provisional
Table 11: Population and votes under the Treaty of Nice.
In 2004, a new voting scheme was suggested in the draft constitution for Eu-
rope (European Union (2004)), which subsequently failed to reach a majority
in referenda in France and in the Netherlands. However, an Intergovernmen-
tal Conference in 2007 has drafted a new Reform Treaty (European Union
(2007)), which, if accepted, will introduce the voting method suggested by
the draft constitution in November 2014. According to this voting scheme, a
proposal is passed, if it satisfies the “double majority” conditions:
(1) At least 55% of the member states (currently 15) vote “yes”, or, if the
Council is not acting on a proposal by the European Commission or the
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
at least 72% of the member states (currently 20) vote “yes”.
(2) The countries voting “yes” represent at least 65% of the population of
the European Union.
During a transition period (2014–2017), the Nice voting system can be used
if this is requested by a member state.
The introduction of a square root voting system was suggested by Sweden
at the Intergovernmental Conference 2000 (Zyczkowski et al. (2006)), and
by Poland in 2007 (EUobserver (2007)), but was turned down by a ma-
jority of EU member states on both occasions. The scheme has also been
brought to the attention of governments in an open letter written by scien-
tists, Scientists for a Democratic Europe (2007).
For both the Nice voting scheme and the draft constitution scheme, the relative
Banzhaf indices βi can be calculated, and the ratio
r =
βi√
Ni/
∑n
j=1
√
Nj
(22)
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can be determined for each country, as a measure of “fairness”. In a voting
system that is fair in the Penrose sense,
r = 1 (23)
should hold for all countries. As shown in figure 5, this is not the case: Both
schemes favour smaller countries (this is due to the allocation of a relatively
large voting weight to small countries in the Nice scheme, and the 55% member
quota in the draft constitution). Furthermore, the draft Constitution favours
the largest countries due to the 65% population quota. This would be accept-
able if these schemes were based on an alternative definition of fairness and
voting power, which does not seem to be the case.
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Fig. 5. Deviation from square root voting power for the Nice and draft Constitution
voting schemes.
For a detailed discussion of the shortcomings of the Nice and draft constitution
schemes see Nurmi and Meskanen (1999), Leech (2002), Baldwin and Widgren
(2003a), Baldwin and Widgren (2003b), Felsenthal and Machover (2004), Felderer et al.
(2003), Plechanovova´ (2003), Barbera` and Jackson (2004), Baldwin and Widgren
(2004).
4.2 Square root voting in the EU
The square root voting scheme suggested by Poland follows the Jagiellonian
Compromise paper Zyczkowski and Slomczynski (2004), which finds (for the
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27 member EU) an optimal quota of approximately 0.615, in the sense that
at this quota, the quantity σ defined in section 2 is minimised. The purpose
of this section is to find the “exact” minimum of σ using double precision
numbers (ie 8 byte real numbers), and to investigate the effect of rounding on
the minimum found.
The method used to minimise σ is the same as in section 3. There are
227 = 134, 217, 728 (24)
different coalitions in the 27 member EU. For each coalition, the square root
voting weight is calculated, and the coalitions that have a voting weight of
0.5 or more are sorted into three subintervals of the interval [0.5, 1], and
within each subinterval are sorted according to their voting weights using
the quicksort algorithm Hoare (1961),Hoare (1962), in the version presented
in Press et al. (1993). As in the four-country examples, the relative Banzhaf
indices are then calculated for all values of the quota R, and σ is then de-
termined as a function of R. On a Pentium 4 PC, this procedure takes a few
minutes. Searching through the values of σ, the minimum is found for
0.614966335781001 < R ≤ 0.614966337885155, (25)
with a value of
σmin = 4.334790× 10−5. (26)
The quantity σ as a function of the quota R around the minimum is shown in
figures 6 to 9, with increasingly improved resolution, where resolution means
the horizontal distance between individual points.
Only very fine resolution reveals the piecewise constant nature of the function
σ, the minimum is obtained in an interval of a length of just over 2 × 10−9.
This means that rounding to less than 10 digits may have a significant impact
on the minimal value of σ as well as on the range of quotas for which it is
obtained.
As pointed out in section 3, the rounding effect may increase or decrease the
deviation from fair square root voting. Thus it is sensible to determine σmin
as described above for weights rounded to k digits, k = 1, . . . , kmax ≈ 10,
and choose the rounding scheme that returns the smallest value of σmin. This
calculation yields the results shown in figure 10.
Figure 10 shows that the rounding effect on σmin is very small provided the
voting weights are rounded to more than four decimal places, but the effect
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Fig. 7. Square root voting in the EU: Deviation from fair voting.
is clearly visible for the 4-digit rounding used in the Jagiellonian Compromise
paper Zyczkowski and Slomczynski (2004). Careful analysis shows that the
minimum of σmin is obtained with 7-digit rounding. In this case, we obtain
σmin = 4.334644× 10−5, (27)
with an optimal quota R in the interval
0.6149670 < R ≤ 0.6149671. (28)
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Both the optimal quota and optimal rounding can change even with small
changes in the population numbers. The same method applied to the 2006
population data (European Statistics Office (2007)) reveals that with those
data, 4-digit rounding is optimal. This means that the rounding scheme and
the quota have to be adjusted annually, to make sure that the smallest possible
deviation from fair square root voting is obtained.
Using 7-digit rounding on the 2007 data, the quotient r defined in equation 22
can be calculated for all 27 member states. This is shown in figure 11.
A final quantity that is of interest is the efficiency ǫ of the voting scheme just
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with 7-digit rounding.
described. It is
ǫ = 0.1644. (29)
This makes the square root method considerably more efficient than the Nice
scheme (ǫ = 0.02026) and the draft constitution (ǫ = 0.1284).
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4.3 Square root voting with a member quota
Slomczyn´ski and Zyczkowski point out (Zyczkowski and Slomczynski (2004))
that it is possible to combine the square root voting scheme with a requirement
that a majority of member states has to vote “yes” for a proposal to be
successful. In fact, it is possible to include any member quota (14 countries,
15 countries, . . . ) in the square root method, which could be used to make
sure that the interests of smaller member states receive adequate attention.
Member quotas can also be employed as a threshold when voting on proposals
not emanating from the European Commission, as is currently the case with
the 18 member quota under the Treaty of Nice.
As in the case without member quota, all possible coalitions are ordered ac-
cording to their voting weights, and the relative Banzhaf indices can then be
calculated for all quotas R, simply by demanding that a coalition is successful
if its voting weight is at least equal to R, and the number of countries included
in the coalition is at least the member quota. The minimum deviation σmin
can then be found as above, and the calculation can be repeated for 1-digit
rounding, 2-digit rounding, etc. The results of this calculation for a number
of member quotas (14, 15, 18 and 20, to reflect the different member quotas
in the Treaty of Nice and the draft constitution) are shown in figure 12.
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Fig. 12. Minimum value of σ from rounded voting weights for different member
quotas. The dotted lines are the values of σmin calculated from double precision
weights.
The data show that the optimal rounding for a member quota of 14, 15 or
18 is six digits, while for the 20 member quota, two digit rounding gives the
smallest value of σmin. Table 12 shows the optimal values of σmin, and the
quota intervals where they occur.
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Member quota R > R ≤ σmin
14 0.646660 0.646661 1.10654 × 10−3
15 0.682884 0.682885 2.17490 × 10−3
18 0.784222 0.784223 6.49661 × 10−3
20 0.80 0.81 1.01626 × 10−2
Table 12
Optimal quota intervals and deviation from fair voting for different member quotas.
For each individual country, the ratio r defined in equation 22 can be calcu-
lated, and compared with the corresponding ratio from the Nice Scheme and
the draft constitution for the same member quota. The results are shown in
figures 13 to 16. As expected, the member quota increases the voting power
of the smaller countries, but it can be seen that even with a member quota,
the square root voting system is fairer in the sense of Penrose.
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Fig. 13. The ratio r for square root voting and Nice with a member quota of 14.
A comparison between the square root voting system and the Nice/consti-
tution schemes should include the efficiencies. Table 13 shows the efficiency of
square root voting with member quotas, and compares them with the corre-
sponding efficiencies in the other two schemes.
It can be seen that for a member quota of 14, the square root voting system
improves the efficiency compared to Nice (the low efficiency of the Nice scheme
was one of the main reasons for introducing a new voting scheme in the draft
constitution). For the other member quotas, the efficiency of the square root
23
2.6
2.4
2.2
2.0
1.8
1.6
1.4
1.2
1.0
0.8
0.6 Malta
Luxembourg
Cyprus
Estonia
Slovenia
Latvia
Lithuania
Ireland
Finland
Slovakia
Denmark
Bulgaria
Austria
Sweden
Hungary
Czech Republic
Belgium
Portugal
Greece
Netherlands
Romania
Poland
Spain
Italy
UKFrance
Germany
r
Draft constitution, member quota 15
Square root voting, member quota 15
Fig. 14. The ratio r for square root voting and the draft constitution with a member
quota of 15.
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Fig. 15. The ratio r for square root voting and Nice with a member quota of 18.
system is considerably lower than that of the two existing schemes, which may
be a reason not to adopt square root voting with these quotas in the form
described in this paper. The reason for the low efficiency is that the optimum
range of quotas occurs at relatively large values of R. However, the function
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Member quota Square root Nice Draft constitution
14 0.104526 0.020256 —
15 0.057132 — 0.128419
18 0.005479 0.015809 —
20 0.000904 — 0.007965
Table 13
Efficiency of square root voting with member quota compared to Nice and the draft
constitution.
σ remains comparatively small even for values of R that are somewhat less
than in the optimal range, and the low efficiency problem may be cured by
choosing such a smaller value of R. The price to pay is a somewhat increased
value of σmin.
5 Summary and conclusions
The concept of voting power according to Penrose, and its implementation
by the Jagiellonian Compromise for the Council of the European Union have
been summarised.
It has been shown that the exact optimal quota for square root voting weights
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can be found analytically, but may depend strongly on the rounding of the
individual voting weights. It was demonstrated by two examples that rounding
may increase or decrease the deviation from fair voting in the sense of Penrose,
and that rounding can be used as a tool to find the optimal voting weights. The
square root voting system has been analysed both on its own, and with the
inclusion of member quotas. For the 2007 population data from the member
states of the EU, the resulting voting weights, optimal quota ranges, and
efficiencies are shown in tables 14 and 15.
Member quota
None 14 15
Germany 0.0944338 0.094434 0.094434
France 0.0828736 0.082874 0.082874
UK 0.0811605 0.081160 0.081160
Italy 0.0800400 0.080040 0.080040
Spain 0.0694152 0.069415 0.069415
Poland 0.0642697 0.064270 0.064270
Romania 0.0483364 0.048336 0.048336
Netherlands 0.0420982 0.042098 0.042098
Greece 0.0347891 0.034789 0.034789
Portugal 0.0338870 0.033887 0.033887
Belgium 0.0337465 0.033746 0.033746
Czech Republic 0.0333846 0.033385 0.033385
Hungary 0.0330205 0.033021 0.033021
vi Sweden 0.0314221 0.031422 0.031422
Austria 0.0299854 0.029985 0.029985
Bulgaria 0.0288442 0.028844 0.028844
Denmark 0.0242930 0.024293 0.024293
Slovakia 0.0241735 0.024173 0.024173
Finland 0.0239106 0.023911 0.023911
Ireland 0.0213545 0.021354 0.021354
Lithuania 0.0191501 0.019150 0.019150
continued on next page
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Table 14 – continued from previous page
Member quota
None 14 15
Latvia 0.0157214 0.015721 0.015721
Slovenia 0.0147583 0.014758 0.014758
Estonia 0.0120598 0.012060 0.012060
Cyprus 0.0091841 0.009184 0.009184
Luxembourg 0.0070557 0.007056 0.007056
Malta 0.0066324 0.006632 0.006632
Quota > 0.6149670 0.6146660 0.682884
Quota ≤ 0.6149671 0.6146661 0.682885
Efficiency 0.1644 0.1045 0.05713
Table 14: Summary of optimal voting weights, optimal
quota ranges, and efficiencies in square root voting with
different member quotas.
Member quota
18 20
Germany 0.094434 0.09
France 0.082874 0.08
UK 0.081160 0.08
Italy 0.080040 0.08
Spain 0.069415 0.07
Poland 0.064270 0.06
Romania 0.048336 0.05
Netherlands 0.042098 0.04
Greece 0.034789 0.03
Portugal 0.033887 0.03
continued on next page
27
Table 15 – continued from previous page
Member quota
18 20
Belgium 0.033746 0.03
Czech Republic 0.033385 0.03
Hungary 0.033021 0.03
vi Sweden 0.031422 0.03
Austria 0.029985 0.03
Bulgaria 0.028844 0.03
Denmark 0.024293 0.02
Slovakia 0.024173 0.02
Finland 0.023911 0.02
Ireland 0.021354 0.02
Lithuania 0.019150 0.02
Latvia 0.015721 0.02
Slovenia 0.014758 0.01
Estonia 0.012060 0.01
Cyprus 0.009184 0.01
Luxembourg 0.007056 0.01
Malta 0.006632 0.01
Quota > 0.784222 0.80
Quota ≤ 0.784223 0.81
Efficiency 0.005479 0.000904
Table 15: Summary of optimal voting weights, optimal
quota ranges, and efficiencies in square root voting with
different member quotas.
It has been shown that these voting schemes have a smaller deviation from
an ideal square root voting power system than both the Nice voting scheme
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and the draft constitution voting scheme. However, for larger member quotas,
the square root voting schemes minimise this deviation for rather large vote
quotas, resulting in very small efficiency. To use square root voting with large
member quotas, a compromise between the desire for a “fair” voting scheme
and an efficient system would have to be found.
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